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The Labour Relations Act and changes to 
the structure of bargaining 
~Greg wood• 
This article discusses the impact of inflationary expectations and outcomes on the 
1987-88 wage round, .the first under the Labour Relations Act1987. 
It tJTgut!s that any trade-offbetween mode~ate wage settl.emenls and the retention of,the 
Mtional award sy.ste.m for at least another year has worked to the advantage of unions 
because of .tM .sharp fall in infl,ation since September 1987. Since real w.ages have in 
general ,at least been mainlained under negotiations which basically took place within ,the 
natio.nal award system, the pressures for major structural changes to the barg,aining system 
QT,t co"espondingly .less than if real wages had, as expected, declined. 
Introduction 
This article addresses the question of changes to the stllucture of bargaining between 
employ~ers and unions following the passage of the Labour Relations Act 1987. Firstly 
the effect of the Labour Relations Act's provisions in respect of bargaining arrang~ements 
are described and .linked with the policy objectives of the Government. The strategies 
available 'to and tak~en up by the parties in the 1987-88 wage round are then ~canvassed. 
The hypothesis is made that both unions and employers appeared pfepared to accept that 
the national award system would continue to operate in this wage round, but that any 
settlements ~eached would have to be set at a :moderate level. 
Results ffom data collect,ed on settlements in the wage round are examined to assess ....... 
the extent of ~changes 10 the structure and nature of bargaining. The impact of inflation 
and inflationary expectations over this period are then analysed. It is .argued that any trade-
off between moderate ·wage seulements and the retention of the national award system for 
at least another year has worked 'LO the advantage of unions because of the sharp fall in 
inflation since September 1987. Since. overall, workers' real wages have at least been 
maintained under negotiations which generally took place within the national award 
system, lhe pressures for major r~efot n1s to the bargaining structure are correspondingly 
less than if real wages had, as expected, declined. 
'The .article does not auempt, how~ever, to pr~edetennine the ~extent or fonn of structural 
change tha·t may occur in the bargaining system. Analysis at the industry or firm level 
will be vital in detea1nining the nature and ~effect of :the structural changes that do (or do 
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not) occur. The article does not, however, attempt to analyse the changes in bargaining 
that have already occurred in some industries and occupations. 
The effect or the Labour Relations Act 
The overall objective of the Labour Relalions Act 1987 is ''to encourage the 
development of effective union and employer organisations which: 
(a) can operate independently of legislativ~e support; and 
(b) can negotiate awards and agreements which are relevant to the industry or 
workplace in which they apply, and which are adhered to." I 
In r~elation to the negotiation of awards and agreements., i.e. the structure of 
bargaining, the .Act provides for ·workers' terms and conditions of employment to be fixed 
by a single set of negotiations . 
In order to ensure this, the union party to an award must choose., on behalf of its 
members, which employ~ers (if any) are to be negotiated with separately, outside of the 
award. Where such a choice is made, those workers are excluded from the coverage of any 
ensuing award and may only be brought back within any subsequent award negotiations by 
agreement with the employer. In addition, where an award does apply to an employer, any 
separate agreement reached with that employer cannot be registered and the ~employ~er in 
that case may apply for an exemption from the award. Such an exemption applies for at 
least the duration of that and the subsequent award and, until the parties agree otherwise, 
for every subsequent award .. The only major exception to this regime is that a composite 
agreement, which relates to settlements between several unions (Lhe min.imum numbers 
required are defined in the Act) and an emp1oyer or employers, may be negotiated and 
registered at any time. 
In essence, this system was developed with the intention of removing "second tier"' 
bargaining from within the framework of the Act. The 'single set of negotiations' 
principle was designed therefore to ensure that once a settlement had been reached covering 
certain unions and employers, that settlement under the .Act ·would be adhered to for its 
duration and any further arrangements that were negotiated would not be collectively 
enforceable. Composite agreements are provided for in order to promote multi-union 
bargaining, as such bargaining provides the ~capacity to greatly limit the number of sets of 
negotiations any one employer may be involved in. 
However, the Act does not serve to impose any particular fonn of bargaining . This is 
seen to be deteuninable by the parties themselv~es, and this intention is reinforced with the 
provision of voluntary rather than any fouu of compulsory arbitration. ..Thus, seUlements 
may cover the full structural range from national awards with ttblanket coverage" to plant 
agreements. It is the union which makes the initial choice, for ~each employer, whether or 
not to pursue separate negotiations with them outside the award. However, as the~e are no 
constraints on the matters parties may negotiate about under the Act and negotiations need 
not necessarily lead to final agreement, the above power is to some extent counter .. 
balanced by the ability of ·either party to exclude any employers and workers from the 
coverage clause of any award or agreement 
Further, the parties need not use the provisions of 'lhc Labour Relations Act ,at all. 
There is nothing to stop .the parties from negotiating settlements that remain unregistered 
1 Government Policy Statement on Labour Relations, September 1986. p. 3. 
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and thus outside the .regime put in place by the Act. Pass-on agreements attached to 
awards and agreements as memoranda are examples of this approach. 
Strategies a·vailable to the parties 
The 1987/88 ·wage round w.as the frrst wage round to be negotiated under the new 
legislation. This in itself was likely to generate conservative responses from the parties. 
The likelihood of such r~esponses was further strengthened by the continuing high degree 
of uncertainty over the state of the ~economy and its futur~e. On the other hand, the 
problems of economic stagnation in certain sectors and rapidly rising unemployment must 
have exerted some pressure on the parties to consider new options for the structure of 
bargaining, other than simply maintaining the national award system. 
It is difficult to generalise and try to present a union and an ~employer perspectiv·e to 
this wage round. Many employers such as those in the hotel industry and many small 
employers, for instance, support the retention of the national award system, while others, 
such as those represented on the Business Roundtable, strongly advocate the dev.elopment 
of decentralised bargaining at the workplace level. Similarly, while unions strongly 
support the principle of the national award system there are some unions to whom, 
because of the particular circumstances affecting their industry or occupation, the 
maintenanoe of the national award is not of paramount significance in practice. This fact 
highlights another major issue. That is, it is unli~ely that a centralised or global solution 
as to how bargaining structllfes might be rearranged can be imposed, if awards and 
agreements are to be relevant to the industry or workplac~e in which they apply. 
Necessarily, these matters are best left to those unions and ~employers directly :affected by 
each set of negotiations. 'Therefore, the major detenuinant of structural change will be the 
actions of those groups, not the actions and policies of the central e·mployer and union 
organisations. In this light, major attention is likely to be focussed, in tetans of structural 
changes agreed to in .this round, on the transport indusLry, parts of the automotive 
assembly and timber industries, perhaps the meat freezing industry (where the fate of the 
national award fiemains uncertain), and lo a lesser extent the ~engineering industry,. 
However, in the present system which has largely been r~elativity-driven, in which the 
pattern for the wage round is effectiv~ely set by a handful of key awards negotiated early in 
the piece, leaving little scope for negotiation in those that follow, there is likely to be 
more emphasis on inter-dependent, co-ordinated or centralised strategies. On the employer 
side, advocacy for the large majority o1 awards is pfovided by the Employers Federation . 
On the union side, altheu-gh ~each union is responsible for its own advocacy and the 
Federation of Labour r~ecommended that a common level of claims was not necessary this 
round, their emphasis on historical relativities and the national award system .mad~e 
co.mmon outcomes, if not common approaches, highly probable. Therefore, I intend to 
assess the strntegies and ou~comes of the 1987/88 wage round from an 'employer' and 
'union' perspective, taking into account the above caveats. 
Before the wage round the Federation of Labour circulated the chart figured below, on 
union options under the new legislation. It signals that unions consider they have most 
to gain &om retaining ·the national award, especially if it were to contain company specific 
schedules or '~~pass-on .. clauses as a means of retaining existing second-tier agreements, and 
from composite agreements. It also idenlifies agreements aHowing the employer 
ex~emption from the award and agreements where the union has nominated an employer out 
of the award ralks for separate negotiations, which are both seen as destructive to the 
national award system, as being the most disadvantageous options for unions. 
On the other hand, at the 1987 'Tripartite Wage Conference, in their spmmary 'The 
1987 Wage Round in Cont~ext of the Economy and the Labour Relations Act,' the 
Employers Federation stated: 
UNIONS 
NATIONAL AWARD 
+ Company specific schedules 
or 
'·pass on clauses'' 
as means of retaining existing 
second-tier agreements. 
• needs two or more employers. 
Registered under LRA. 
Enfor:ceable under LRA. 
Obviously retains the award. 
AWARD/AGREEMENT OPTIONS UNDER LABOUR RELATIONS ACT 
UNIONS 
COMPOSITE AGREEMENT 
(S.166) 
between several unions & 
employers on one site 
or on several sites with several 
employers. 
needs 50% of unions or five 
unions (involved in the 
undertakings), whichever is the 
lesser, 
and one employer. 
Registered under LRA. 
Enforceable under LRA. 
Automatic return to award if 
withdrawn - has negative effect 
on national award and wage 
rates. 
UNIONS 
COMPOSITE AWARD 
(S. 137) 
initiated jOi'\tiY by 
several unions or 
several employers. 
needs two or more unions 
and two or more employers. 
• 
Registered under LRA. 
Enforceable under LRA. 
has negative effect on national 
award and wage rates. 
Plant/enterprise union. 
EMPLOYERS 
AGREEMENTS (S. 164) 
where union has nominated an 
employer out of the award talks 
for separate negotiations, ie 
before the conciliation council i6 
formed. 
· needs .only one employer and 
one union. 
. 
Registered under LRA. 
Enforceable under LRA. 
lose award coverage. 
May return to award coverage if 
, employer agrees. 
,Destructive to national award 
system . 
EMPLOYERS 
AGREEMENTS (S. 152) 
where union or group of workers 
has not nominated an employer 
out of the award talks but 
initiates separate negotiations 
anyway. 
one employer 
one union or a group of 
workers. 
Not registerable under LRA. 
Not enforceable under LRA. 
Have to be enforced in civil 
courts. 
Employer may apply for a 
exemption from award. 
Destructive to national award 
and union. 
.. ~------------------~--------------------~--------------------_.----------------------------------------~ 
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In approaching the wage round employers have two basic options. 
The first is lo accept the perpetuation of 'the existing national award system and suffer 
the inevitable consequences of business ~closures and further job losses. 
The second is to say "no" and take initiatives towards workplace and/or 'true industry 
bargaining in the interests of stability, job r~etention and prospective growth. 
To say "no" will, under present union attitudes, meet major resistance and cause 
disruption to the lives of workers and their families, our fragile markets and to the 
economy as a whole .... 
If the action of ~Government and the attitudes of the FOL/CSU require, employers 
will pick up one of these unpalatable options. 
The Employers Federation have also consistently stated that any changes in award levels 
must be sustainable by the lower quartile of industry. 
It appears clear from the results of the wage round, as analysed later, that unions i 
general pursued the national award system and the employers picked up the frrst of their 
"unpalatable" options. However, as analysed below, it also seems clear employers were 
prepared 'tO accept a delay in any general moves towards changing the bargaining structure 
in this round, but only provided wage settlements could be sustained by the lower quartile 
of industry. This effectively meant a continuation of their 1986 strategy which led to 
average settlements below the recorded level of inflation over the tenn of awards and 
voluntary collective agreements. Such a solution, whether the result of explicit or 
implicit strategies, is in the nature of a trade-off and the results of that trade-off are also 
analysed below. 
Resu'lts of the 1987-88 wage round 
It may be apposite to note that the fact that there is an identifiable 1987-88 wage round 
and that it 4.qlpearS there will similarly be a 1988-89 round, are indications in themselves 
of little change in the system. 
A statistical analysis of seUlements advised to the New .Zealand Employers Federation2 
yields a great deal of unifotnaity in tet11as of the settlement of awards and agreements. 
Approximately 80 peroent of the 263 documents settled by April 28, 1988 provided for 
wage increases of between 7 and 8 percent. Another 13 percent settled at between 8 and 9 
percenl The full data is contained in Table 1 below. This dispersal is in line with what 
has generally been observed in a "usualu wage round. The pattern of wage increases 
certainly cannot be said to reflect the varying economic circumstances affecting different 
industries, r~egions and fu11as. 
It should also be noted that where there were 'high' settlements, such as for drivers and 
for ~engineers at Nissan, this was often the result of significant changes to the bargaining 
structure. 
2 New Zealand Employers Federation Report on Recent Wag~e Negotiations 1987-88 Wage 
Round as at Thursday, Apri128, 1988. 
While Employers Federation data does not ~cover all awards and agreements, including n1any 
in the Slate Owned Enterprises. other single employer agreements, and the maritin1e and other 
industries, it provides 'the most comprehensive data available until the Arbitration 
Commission's registration of documents negotiated in the round is completed later this year. 
'This later data will provide significant insights into the nature and extent of changes to the 
bargaining structure. In particular, the extent to which composite bargaining has become 
more prevalent will be able to be assessed. 
Table 1: Analysis by size of wage incr.ease 
Wage Increase 
6.00 percent to 6.5 percent 
6.6 percent ~o 6.99 percent 
7 percent 
7.1 percent to 7.5 percent 
7.6 percent to 8 pefcent 
8.1 percent to 8 . 5 percent 
8.6 pelicent to 9 pelicent 
Over 9 peroent 
State linked 
Frequency 
2 
2 
148 
33 
28 
17 
18 
6 
9 
Percent 
0.8 
0.8 
56.3 
12.5 
10.6 
6.5 
6.8 
2.3 
3.4 
Similarly, Table 2 below shows little variation in settlements relating to allowances 
and other conditions of employment The only changes of any significance appear to have 
taken place in the "service allowance" and "other conditions" categories. 
Table 2: Chang.es in conditions 
~Conditions Legend* 
Service allowance increased/restructured 
Registration payment increased 
Meal money increased 
Shift allowances increased 
Indentureship allowances increased 
Penal payment changes 
Industry allowance inserted/increased 
Increased sick pay entitlements 
Regional/sector variations 
New qualification payment 
Other significant changes in conditions 
*NB: "Increased" means increased more than wages. 
Numbers 
Changed 
27 
1 
7 
1 
4 
3 
ll 
15 
0 
1 
39 
Percentage of 
Total Settlements 
10.2 
0.4 
2.7 
0.4 
1.5 
1.1 
4 . 2 
5 . 7 
0 
0.4 
14.8 
Other infonnation of inter~est that may be gleaned from the data is that 28 or 1 0 . 6 
pefcent of the documents ~contained pass-on memoranda and that 12 or 4 . 6 percent of the 
documents were either the r~esult of r·estructuring, or there was agr·eement to restructure the 
award or agreement. In addition, there were 18 cases where the parties agreed to ~establish a 
working party to address certain issues that had arisen out of the negotiations. These arc 
the areas where specific analysis will provide the best measure as to the nature and extent 
of changes to the bargaining structure. 
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Implications ror the structure of bargaining 
Despite the limitations in the data, and given that a full analysis will only be possible 
once registration of all awards and agreem~ents in this round has taken place, certain 
observations may be made. 'The first re'lates to the general level of wage settlement 
reached of around 7-8 percent I have already outlined the hypothesis that unions were 
prepared to make the sacrifice of a "moderate round", especially given the depressed state of 
many industries, in return for the retention of national awards, at least for one year. This 
would also serve to give themselves time to prepafe their strategies over the S'lruCtllfe of 
awards and agreements in the longer term. Similarly, employers appeared prepared to 
accept the retention of the national award system, at least in this round, provided the costs 
of settlement could be borne by the large majority of employ~ers subject to the award. 
It is important in Ibis context to contrast the inflationary ~expectations of the parties at 
the time what proved to be the "going rate" was negotiated, with the level of inflation that 
is now expected ~o occur over the duration of the awards and agreements negotiated. 
Inflation levels are important to both parties because they deteunine on the one hand for 
workers, whether their feal wages will be maintained and on the other hand for ~employers, 
whether their feal labour costs will incr~ease or decline. While it is the producers' price 
index which is more relevant to employers' real costs, rather than the consumers' price 
index, which relates more closely to workers' real incomes and which is analysed here, the 
two indices g~enerally move fairly much in tande.m. 
Many commentators and actors in the system argue that wages would better reflect 
changes in the demand for and supply of labour if they were set according to changes in 
unit labour costs, rather than merely changes in the economy generally. Unit labour costs 
are labour costs per unit of output produced. They are therefore calculated by dividing the 
total cost of labour by the number of units of output and are thus strongly related to 
productivity. While there are sound economic arguments to justify this position, levels of 
productivity vary so much from fi1nt to fi11n and industry to industry that it is very 
difficult to bring such considerations into the national award framework .. Therefore, it is 
the question of real wages and labour costs that is analysed here. 
The New Zealand Metal Trades Employees Award was the frrst major award to settle, 
on 9 September 1987, and this was at the 7 percent level. This was to set the floor for 
the 7-8 percent average settlement. Clearly, however, preparation for the round had 
commenced well befor~e this date. The Government had presented its commentary on the 
economic ~environment and the outlook for the forthcoming wage round on June 29, 1987. 
It highlighted the consequences of unrealistic settlements in the round and indicated that 
inflation was expected to decline sharply in the December quarter to reach around 7-'9 
percent for the year to March 1988. However, it was also estimated that the underlying 
inflation rate (allowing for the impact of GST) was approximately 12 percent for the year 
ended March 1987. 
Measured inflation, however, reached a peak in the year ended June 1987 of 18.9 
percent. The President of the Federation of Labour reacted to this announcement by 
arguing for significant wage increases to offset consum·er price increases, while the 
Employers Federation considered negotiations should be forward looking and reflect the 
tight economic situation. This reflects a dilemma in wage bargaining; namely the extent 
to which adjusunents are prospective or retrospective. In any event, such an unexpectedly 
high level of recorded inflation is very likely to hav~e affected the parties' approach to wage 
bargaining, for the reasons given above. 
The National Bank, in its 'Business Outlook', publishes the results of a monthly 
survey on inflationary ~expectations, amongst other things. The survey respondents are 
principally from small to medium size businesses, thus providing a reason~ble cross-
section of the New Zealand business community. It ~covers the retailing, manufacturing, 
transport~ construction and fanning sectors. Union coverage is strong in all but the first 
and last of these sectors. Table 3 compares the annual inflationary expectations of 
• 
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respondents (made one year earlier) and fecorded inflation from February 1987 to April 
1989. 
Table 3: Expected inflation (surveyed one year previously) compared with recorded 
inflat.ion 
Year Ended 
February 1987 
March 1987 
April1987 
May 1987 
June 1987 
July 1987 
August 1987 
September 1987 
October 1987 
Nov~ember 1987 
December 1987 
February 1988 
March 1988 
April 1988 
May 1988 
June 1988 
July 1988 
August 1988 
September 1988 
October 1988 
November 1988 
December 1988 
February 1989 
March 1989 
April 1'989 
Expected Inflation (Peroent) 
16.3 
15.3 
13.7 
13.5 
12.7 
12.7 
13.1 
13.2 
13.8 
13.7 
13.9 
14.4 
14.1 
14.0 
12.9 
12.5 
12.2 
12.9 
12.6 
13.3 
12.2 
I 1..8 
10.2 
10 . 0 
9.2 
Recorded Inflation (Peocent) 
(Consumer Price Index) 
18.3 
18.9 
16.9 
9.6 
9.0 
The table highlights the volatility of inflationary levels as the effects of GST work 
their way through the system and the 'stickiness' of inflationary expectations. 
~or equal interest, in terms of the real wage outcomes of the round, are the present 
projections for inflation in the years ending June and September 1988, which ar·e 7.0 
percent for June and an even lower figure for September. The implications flowing fron1 
the latter figure, which approximately accords with the term of many awards and 
agreements are that, on average, settlements will have resulted in the maintenance of, or 
perhaps ~even improvements in, workers' wages in real tenns. Similarly, the average cost 
of wages to employers will hav~e risen, or at least stayed at the same level, relative to l 
other costs facing e·mployers over this period. 
This has ther~efore meant that any rrade-off between a "low" wage round and deferring 
action on the restructuring of bargaining arrangements, which may have been either 
definitely or implicitly agr~eed on, has not actually occurr·ed in practice.. It is important to 
note here that when the 7 percent "wage path" was set, annualised inflationary 
expectations wefe at about 11.5 percen~ 5.5 percent above the wage path. This fact must, 
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however, be offset by the extent to which any retrospective adjusunent to wage levels, 
which might otherwise have been agreed on, was foregone. This was why the ,metal trades 
settlement was described by commentators at the time as "very constructive" and 
"relatively modest". 3 
For employers there are two obvious implications that follow from this result. One is 
that employers have not received the expected benefit of reduced real wage costs. Therefore 
those employers who were experiencing lower levels of profitability (i.e. many of those in 
the 'lower quartile') will have found these costs particularly difficult to absorb. The second 
is that support for a greater decentralisation of bargaining from union members who have 
the industrial strength to demand higher than average settlements will be lesser, given that 
they have been able to maintain or beuer their positions under what in essence remains the 
national award system, when implicitly such strategies were expected to see them worse 
off. Those workers' positions would be further protected where pass-on memoranda were 
agreed to, ,given that such workers will have been receiving above-award rates in the past. 
From the union perspective, they have succeeded, to a very great extent, in 
maintaining the national award system for the 1987-88 wage round. This deferral of 
changes to bargaining arrangements allows them time to better assess their future options 
and strategies for the structure of bargaining under the new legislation. In addition, they 
have pfobably at least maintained (if not perhaps improved) the real wages of the vast 
majority of their members. Such a result is likely to only further defer structural change 
to bargaining arrangements, it is argued. 
It should also be noted that inflationary expectations tend to follow the direction of 
recorded inflation. This is illustrated, for example, by significant declines in inflationary 
expectations for the years ending May 1988 and February 1989,following recorded falls in 
inflation, and by an increase for the years ending February 1988 and August 1988, after 
recorded increases. Inflationary expectations now appear tD be falling quite rapidly. The 
most recent forecast (for the year ending April 1989) was down at 9.2 percent, and that 
was befolie the announcement of the further decline in recorded inflation for the year ended 
March 1988. The latest predictions for recorded inflation for the year ended June 1988 are 
about 7 percent, as the annual figures will by then not include the high 3.3 pe~cent 
quarterly increase in the June 1987 quarter. This figure will be announced during the 
period wage negotiators are pr~eparing for the forthcoming round and should thus further 
feintorce the downward trend in inflationary expectations. This in tum should result, an 
other things being equal, in low~er average wage ~ttlements than might otherwise have 
been the case. To the extent that wage inc~eases feed through into increased costs, such 
moderat~e settlements will further assist 'the Government's anti-inflationary strategy. 
However, despite the rapid fall in inflation and inflationary expectations, the 
respondents to the National Bank survey are still predicting inflation in a year's time to be 
higher than recorded levels for the past year. Commentators in this field hav,e, for at least 
the last year, consistently forecasted lower levels of inflation than those predicted by the 
respondents to the survey, who are mainly made up of small and medium-sized businesses. 
It may be that such businesses do not have the resources or expertise to spend on inflation 
forecasting, but that does not derogate from the fact that "expert" opinion has been widely 
and freely available, but has been discounted to some extent. The most likely explanation 
for this 'stickiness' in expectations is scepticism over the ability of any New Zealand 
Government to success~ully institute an enduring programme of disinflation .. ~Given New 
Zealand's poor record in terms of inflation over the past fifteen or so years, such 
scepticism should surprise no-one. For this reason, settlements in the t:orthcoming wage 
round may again be abov~e those that may have been reached given perfect knowledge by 
the bargaining parties. However, to attempt to attribute blame for this state of affairs to 
3 
'Herbert Roth, 'Chronicle, New Zealand journal of industrial relations 12: December 1987 
the negotiating parties, despite the fact that under the Labour Relations Act they are 
totally responsible for their own bargains, ·would be facile. 
Conclusion 
The Labour Relations Act has not been in ~orce for sufficient time to assess whether 
its provisions will lead to the negotiation of awards and agreements which are relevant to 
the industry or workplace in which they apply. Whether this occurs or not is dependent 
largely on the attitudes of the bargaining parties. To the extent that unions ignore the 
need for wages to be more closely related to productivity and the differing positions of 
workers in diffefent fit n1s, industries and regions, and employers remain feticent to share 
infonnation and to accept that their own work,ers and their respective unions have a 
participatory role to play in their enterprises, then such flexible and relevant settlements 
will be limited in number. Such a situation would ensure the maintenance of a slow 
adjusting, low-wage, low-productivity labour market and hence an underperforming 
economy. 
The results of the first ·wage round under the Act showed that both unions and 
employers appeared prepar~ed to accept a strategy that for unions would provide the 
continued aegis of the national award system and for employers would deliver moderate 
wage settlements. However, the rapid fall in inflation since September 1987 will 
probably mean that the level of workers' real wages will be ·maintained, over the round, 
rather than lowered as may have been expected. In teitllS of bargaining arrangements, this 
result is therefore likely to reduce the pressures on workers and their unions to accept 
change in bargaining structures. Thus the effect of inflation and inflationary expectations 
over the 1987-88 wage fOund may be to defer structural changes in bargaining, at least in 
some industries and occupations. However, this result need not necessarily prejudice the 
ability of the parties to develop, in time, mutually beneficial bargaining structures which 
can generate a more responsive labour market .and enhanced economic outcomes. 
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